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SHALL WE BE ARBITRARY OR REASONABLE:
STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY THRESHOLD
DETERMINATIONS UNDER NEPA
Why, lad, they tell me, that on the Big-lakes there's the best of hunting
and a great range, without a white man on it, unless it may be one like
myself. I'm weary of living in clearings, and where the hammer is
sounding in my ears from sunrise to sundown.*
In the early nineteenth century, when Cooper's Natty Bumppo ran
westward to avoid the encroachment of oncoming settlers, the wilderness and
its bounty must have indeed seemed endless. Our pioneers and entrepreneurs
did not hesitate to appropriate those resources to gradually develop our present
industrialized and highly technical society. Economic growth has been a top
objective of our government from the time of Alexander Hamilton to the pres-
ent. However, in the late 1960's and early 1970's Congress responded to a ris-
ing consciousness that there was a need "to control, at long last, the destructive
engine of material progress,"' and enacted a series of statutes concerned with
preserving the quality of our environment.'
The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), went into
effect on January 1, 1970.1 It consists of a declaration of purpose followed by
two separate titles.' Title I contains both the broad policy statement of
Congress "to use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony," 5 and the "action-forcing mechanism ' of Section 102(2)(c) that
requires all Federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for
all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 7 Title I1 established the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), designed to be an overseer of the NEPA, and to promulgate guidelines
for compliance with the Act!
*J. COOPER. THE PIONEERS (1823).
'Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
'E.g., Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4331-4334 (1976) (NEPA).
'42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). The origins of NEPA and the course of its enactment are described in THIRD AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 221-24 (1972).
-/d.
11d. at 101.
'it was first called this by Senator Henry Jackson, sponsor of NEPA in the Senate. See Hearings on S.1075,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1969).
'NEPA at § 102(2)(c).
sd. See City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 539 F.Supp. 1237, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) rev'd,
715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). (The CEQ regulations are not themselves
binding on other agencies.)
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The NEPA has been described as "woefully ambiguous" 9 and its
"meager" legislative history has not greatly aided courts in its interpretation."
However, this very lack of data on Congressional intent is one factor which
has encouraged courts to freely interpret the NEPA." As Justice Marshall has
stated, "this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a
catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA. To date, the courts
have responded in just that manner and have created such a 'common law'."' 2
Clearly, the courts have played the dominant role in enforcing compliance
with the procedural requirements of the NEPA, and to the extent that these
procedural requirements have been defined and implemented, the courts may
be credited with this achievement.' 3
The bulk of litigation under the NEPA has come from the action-forcing
mechanism of the environmental impact statement." Section 102(2)(c) of the
Act requires all agencies of the Federal government to "include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement."' 5 This procedural mechanism, of a detailed impact state-
ment, was intended to alter the decision making process of federal agencies so
that environmental concerns would be given "appropriate consideration in
decision making along with economic and technical considerations."' 6 In addi-
tion, the environmental impact statement serves to advise other interested
agencies and the public of the environmental consequences of planned federal
action. 7 In this way, the NEPA serves as "an affirmative freedom of informa-
tion act."' 8 This externalization of the agency review process, through inclu-
sion of other agencies and the public, was an innovative method meant to
guard against excessive agency bias in considering environmental matters. It
was feared that other traditional bureaucratic concerns would tend to receive
more emphasis'9 in absence of this requirement.
'Voight, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory Agency, 5 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW 13 (1972).
"Calvert Cliffs. 449 F.2d at 1126.
"Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16
NAT. RESOURCES J. 323, 330 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cortnerl.
'
2Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976).
"
3Cortner, supra note 1I, at 333-34.
'IF. ANDERSON. NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973).
1NEPA § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
1Id.
"Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F.Supp. 356, 364 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
"'Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis of the Historical Development and Contemporary
Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 557, 611 (1984).
"Dreyfus and Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 N,.t RE.
SOURCEs J. 243, 247-255 (1976) (However, the authors also say that the inter-agency comment proced!ure
was part of a compromise between Senators Jackson and Muskie, to avoid NEPA intruding upon the au.
thority of the environmental agencies under the jurisdiction of Senator Muskie's Public Works Subcommit-
tee.)
[Vol. 19:4
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The impact statement has proven to be an important tool which provides
valuable information to environmentalists and to other concerned groups, at
agency expense.2" This approach has enabled these groups to more effectively
oppose projects which have agency-defined adverse environmental impacts,
and this litigation has forced agencies to take environmental concerns serious-
ly. 21
Under the NEPA, the agency with overall responsibility for the proposed
federal action is entrusted with the task of preparing the environmental impact
statement.2 A federal agency may not "rubber stamp" a state or privately
prepared impact statement to satisfy the requirements of the NEPA, but in-
stead must itself study the impacts.23 However, not all federal actions require
that an impact statement be prepared; only those actions that are "major" and
"significantly" impact upon the human environment call for the preparation of
a statement.
The statutory language would seem to indicate a two-prong test looking
towards size and significance, but that is not how the greater number of courts
have interpreted the statutory language. The current holding seems to be that
"significance" is the truly important test, and that "major" merely indicates
that size should be an important factor in determining significance. The
reasoning is that even if a very minor project still has a profound impact upon
the environment, perhaps because of cumulative effect, then an environmental
impact statement would still be required.26
The agency which would have the task of preparing the environmental
impact statement for a proposal is responsible for making the threshold deter-
mination of whether the impact statement is necessary.27 The agency is to
evaluate the environmental consequences of a proposal before it, and then
decide if those consequences would have any adverse effects upon the environ-
ment.2" If the agency deems these effects significant, then it proceeds to
prepare a detailed impact statement which studies these effects so that they
may be given serious consideration along with other factors in a cost-benefit
'Friesma and Culhane, Social Impacts. Politics and the Environmental Impact Statement Process. 16 NA I.
RitSOUR(IES J. 339, 340 11976).
2Id.
"Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F.Supp. 877, 880 (D. Oregon 1971).
"Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F.Supp. 105, 120 (D.N.H. 1975) (However, an agency may
make use of information and findings from state and privately prepared statements).
1'NEPA § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. 4332 (1976).
"See Hanly v. Kliendienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
2-Id.
"Pokorny v. Costle, 464 F.Supp. 1273, 1275 ID. Nebraska 1979): Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269,
271 18th Cir. 1980).
"Id.
C0) mMrlI -N I'S
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analysis." On the other hand, if the agency initially finds no significant impact,
then it does not prepare an impact statement. 3
The problem with agency threshold determinations of no significant envi-
ronmental impact is that other agencies and the public are not allowed the
same quality of information and participation they would have if an environ-
mental impact statement were prepared. 3' Adverse effects that might surface
from an environmental impact statement are not identified and thus do not
enter agency analysis. 32 For some federal projects or proposals, it is clear that
an impact statement is necessary. For example, a large hydroelectric project
that will involve flooding thousands of acres will obviously have an important
effect on the surrounding environment. For other projects and proposals, such
as the construction of a high-rise building in a downtown area with other high-
rise buildings, it is not clear that there will be any adverse environmental im-
pacts.33 This is the "grey" area when the courts have played an important role. 4
The courts have dealt with this problem area in various ways. Hanly v.
Kliendienst3 was the first important circuit court decision establishing the re-
quirement that "in making the threshold determination authorized by Section
1022)(c) of NEPA the agency must affirmatively develop a reviewable en-
vironmental record. 36 Other courts followed Hanly in requiring a reviewable
agency record of the threshold determination.37 This court-enforced require-
ment was embodied in the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) regula-
tion recommending the preparation of an "environmental assessment" as a
preliminary device to aid in the determination of whether a full impact state-
ment is necessary.38 The CEQ regulations indicate that the environmental
assessment should be comprehensive in its study of the effects of a proposed ac-
tion before the agency can determine from the assessment whether the action
is "significant" for the purposes of the NEPA.39
"('alvert Cly/.], 449 F.2d at 1113-14.
"'See Hanly v. Kliendienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
"Andrews, Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications. 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 311
11976).
.-'Id. (An example is Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth.. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir.
1972). where the court ordered T.V.A. to redo its environmental impact statement because it was not suffi-
ciently thorough and contained only "unsupported conclusions." The result of the new and thorough impact
investigation was the discovery of the "snail darter," a previously unknown and rare species of fish, which
existed only in the Little Tennessee River. and which would be threatened by the proposed project.)
"See First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 17th Cir. 1973).
"HanlY. 471 F.2d at 837.
"471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 19721, cert. denied. 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
"Id. at 827.
"See Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn. 524 F.2d 225 17th (ir. 19751, cert. denied. 424 U.S.
967 11975): First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1381 17th Cir. 1973): Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1131 4th Cir. 1971).
';40C.FR. § 1508.919811.
' Id.
I'Vol. 19:4
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Judge Friendly, in his dissent in Hanly v. Kliendienst," expressed concern
that this type of environmental assessment was a "mini-impact" statement
which might "come to replace the impact statement in the grey area. ' ,
However, the courts have come to recognize a substantial difference between
the environmental assessment, which is brief, and the environmental impact
statement, which must be detailed and is to consider many more factors.
42
The environmental assessment acts as a screening device to enable the
agency to separate those significantly impacting projects from the insignificant
ones, and allows agencies with limited resources to focus on truly crucial
federal actions.4 3 Nevertheless, even with this much of a record of agency con-
sideration there still exists the possibility of agency oversight of important con-
siderations. Also, agency abuse might be present in the process of compiling
and reviewing the environmental consequences of actions, when important
threshold determinations are made. The impact statement process requires a
lengthy period for comment by other agencies and the public," and this costs
the agency much in time and resources.4 5 The temptation to avoid this "expen-
sive" process may be a factor in areas where it seems possible. Court review of
threshold determinations insures that the agency is not avoiding its NEPA
mandated responsibilities." Careful court review is important because, "the
spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, -x parte decision that the proj-
ect was minor or did not significantly affect the environment were too well
shielded from impartial review.
The NEPA gives no indication of the proper standard of review to be
employed by courts when examining agency threshold determinations.48 The
circuit courts currently use divergent standards of review in looking at agency
threshold determinations which find no significant impact.49 The United States
Supreme Court has declined to decide which standard should be applied," thus
leaving the lower federal courts in some confusion over which standard to ap-
ply. The amount of discretion allowed the agencies in making threshold deter-
minations varies among the federal appellate courts, although the courts will
'471 F.2d at 836-40.
41Id. at 837.
2Lower Alloways Creek Township v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 741 (3d Cir. 1982).
4'Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1982).
"§ 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
4
'Friesma and Culhane, supra note 20 at 340-4 1, (the authors offer an interesting discussion of N EPA used
as a delaying weapon, often used to defeat projects by imposing such costly delays that the projects were
eventually abandoned).
'"liwer Allotay' (reek Rnwnvhip. 6X7 [-.2d at 741.
Save tOur Ten Acre,, v. Kreger. 472 F.2d 403. 46 i5th (Oir. 19731.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 119761.
"The Ist. 2d. 41h. 7t1 and ).C. Circuit use the *arbitrary and capricious" standard- I h' d. Ili. XiII and
I0th use the 'reasonahleness" standard.
"See e.g.. Gee v. Royd. 105 S.Ct. 2123 119X5).
Spring, 19861 COM MENTS
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usually give substantial weight to agency determinations because their pro-
cesses involve the analysis of technical data as well as the making of subjective
value judgments.5' This comment focuses on what these standards are, how
they differ, and the problems they present.
THE "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD
As mentioned above, Hanly v. Kliendiens 2 was the first important cir-
cuit court decision dealing with the issue of what standard of review a court
should use in reviewing an agency decision not to prepare an environmental
impact statement. In that case the General Services Administration's (GSA)
had determined that the construction of a jail in Manhatten posed no problems
of environmental impact. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had to decide whether the GSA's determination satisfied the pro-
cedural requirements of the NEPA. 3 That court outlined its proper function
when reviewing agency decisions, which was:
to determine de novo all relevant questions of law ... and ... to abide by
the Administrative Procedure Act, which limits us in matters not involv-
ing an agency's rule making or adjudicatory function to determining
whether its findings are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure
required by law. 4
To apply the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)5 standards the court
must determine whether agency findings are factual, thus discretionary, or in-
stead legal, thus subject to de novo review.56 The more factual in nature an
agency decision is, the narrower the scope of review by the courts.57 This im-
plies great difficulty in deciding mixed questions of fact and law. The Hanly
court attempted to resolve this dilemma by first stating that the issue in the
case involved a question of law in the meaning of the word "significantly," and
a question of fact in whether the project would have a signficantly adverse en-
vironmental impact."
The Hanly court then developed a two-factor test to determine whether
an action is environmentally significant. First, the court considered "the extent
to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those
"Note, Montana Grizzly Bears Protest Exploratory Drilling in Wilderness Area, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 467
S1983).
"2471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
531d.
'"d. at 828.
55APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1972).
"Peltz and Weinman, NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Framework of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMi L. Rt.x
71, 78 (1976).
"Id. at 79.
"Hanl., 471 F.2d at 830.
[Vol. 19:4
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created by existing uses in the area."5 Next, the court looked at the "absolute"
or cumulative harm resulting from the action's "contribution to existing
adverse conditions.16) The court stated that it would then look to see whether
the agency's environmental assessment satisfied that two-part test in matters
considered by the agency, and whether the agency observed the procedure re-
quired by law in making its assessment and determination of no significant im-
pact." If the agency demonstrated by its record that it made an "informed
preliminary decision," rather than an "arbitrary and capricious" one, then the
Hanly court would not require anything further.62
One of the major reasons given by the Hanly court for choosing the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard is respect for the agencies' expertise in evaluat-
ing the technical data and subjective factors.63 Because these agencies possess
expertise which the Hanly court felt it lacked, the court stated that it should al-
low the agencies "to have some leeway in applying the law to factual
contexts."64
Other circuit courts have followed the lead of Hanly by applying the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard, and they have chosen it for similar reasons.
The Seventh Circuit has shown its deferential attitude to agency expertise in
quantifying areas of uncertain environmental values.65 The First Circuit has
selected the arbitrary and capricious standard because it is "quite narrow in
scope, 66 and only allows the court to "assure itself that the agency has given
good faith consideration to the environmental consequences of its actions."6
The Fourth Circuit has also exhibited this same deferential attitude to agency
decisionmaking under the NEPA, stating in one decision" that "generally ...
the decision not to prepare an EIS [environmental impact statement] is left to
the informed discretion of the agency."'69 None of these courts have accepted
the proposition that the policy goals and language of the NEPA call for a
stricter approach in the review of agency decisionmaking.
Of course, even under the most deferential standard of reviewing thresh-
old determinations under the NEPA, some of the lower courts in these circuits
111d. at 830-31.
wid.
'lid. at 832.
621d. at 835.
1Id. at 836.
lId. at 829-30.
63Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1975).
"Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 list Cir. 1980).
"Id. at 1072.
"Providence Road Community Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 683 F.2d 80 14th Cir. 1982).
"Id. at 82.
Sp~ring, 19861 CO)MMIENTIS
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have nevertheless been inventive in getting around the narrow scope of review.
They have invalidated agency decisions which were considered incorrect. In
City of New York v. United States Department of Transportation0 the court
ordered the Department of Transportation (DOT) to prepare an environmental
impact statement for its plan to authorize the transport of hazardous waste
through New York City via the city's freeways.1 Although the DOT dem-
onstrated through complicated scientific data that the likelihood of serious
consequences arising from a highway accident was of very low probability,72
the court nonetheless said that the finding of no significant environmental im-
pact was "insufficiently supported by the present record." 3 The court found
the DOT ruling arbitrary and capricious "to the extent the regulation man-
dates the transport through densely populated areas of other materials - in
particular, of spent fuel and other large quantity radioactive material -
against the will of local and state legislatures."7 ' The court held that even a
small chance of a serious adverse effect called for an environmental impact
statement.75
As can be seen, the line often blurs between questions of law and fact
when a court reviews the difficult question of whether an agency has properly
considered the environmental impacts of a proposal. Even in a case such as
Hanly v. Kliendienst where the finding of no significant impact was not clearly
arbitrary, the court still ordered further agency consideration of the matter in
the form of a more detailed environmental assessment.76
These deviations lead to inconsistency in the application of the standard,
and demonstrate that it is not a sufficiently flexible standard for the purposes
of the NEPA. It is difficult to reconcile the aforementioned City of New
York" and its narrowing of the scope of agency discretion with a case which
supposedly applies the same standard, Providence Road Community Associa-
tion v. Environmental Protection Agency.7" In Providence Road, the court
upheld the EPA's threshold determination of no significant impact of a
wastewater treatment project in a rural area." The court stated that it would
"assume that the agencies have exercised this discretion appropriately," unless
there was a positive showing of arbitrary action. 0 Overall, this standard has
'0539 F.Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
71/d.
'id. at 1241.
1id. at 1242.
'
41d. at 1261.
'lid. at 1242.
16Hanly, 471 F.2d at 826.
77539 F.Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
"1683 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1982).
7Id.
'ld. at 82.
[Vol. 19:4
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not proven workable, nor have the courts who use it developed a consistent ap-
proach in its application.
THE FOUR-PART TEST
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has adopted the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard as its method of review.8' However, it has mod-
ified this to include a four-part test to review an agency's finding of no sig-
nificant impact to the environment.82 The court would, in this test, determine:
I) whether the agency took a 'hard look' at the problem;
(2) whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental
concern;
(3) as to the problems studied and identified, whether the agency made a
convincing case that the impact was insignificant; and
(4) if there was an impact of true significance, whether the agency con-
vincingly established that changes in the project sufficiently reduced it
to a minimum."
The agency's threshold determination must meet all of these factors to pass
review in this circuit. 4
In Sierra Club v. Peterson, 5 the court reviewed a finding of no significant
impact made by the United States Forest Service before it issued oil and gas
leases in the Targhee and Bridger-Teton National Forests of Idaho and Wyom-
ing.86 The Sierra Club court applied its four-part test and found that the Forest
Service had taken a "hard look" at the problem and had identified the relevant
areas of environmental concern. 7 However, the court found that the record
did not support a finding of no significant impact, because of a small possibility
that some of the leases might permit a level of exploratory activity that could
produce significant adverse impacts.88
This case demonstrates a stricter standard of review than the arbitrary
and capricious standard usually employed in the First, Second, Fourth and
Seventh Circuits. It places less trust in agency discretion and more closely
scrutinizes agencies charged with carrying out the procedural mandates of the
NEPA. By looking at whether "relevant areas" were studied, and whether the
agency made a "convincing case" of insignificant impact, the Sierra Club court
"Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 19831.
11d. at 1413.
"8Id.
bid.
"717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"id. at 1410-11.
"Id. at 1413.
Uld. at 1413-14.
Spring, 19861 CO)MMENTS
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indicates that it will allow the agency much less discretion in its appraisal of
what constitutes an insignificant impact.
However, Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has not
been consistent in its approach, and this inconsistency has produced confusion.
Earlier, in 1982, this same circuit decided Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v.
Peterson.8" In that decision, the court reviewed another threshold determina-
tion of no significant impact made by the Forest Service."
The Forest Service had approved a plan for exploratory mineral drilling in
the Cabinet Mountains Wilderness Area of northwestern Montana.' The area
is one of only six ecosystems in the United States that supports grizzly bears, a
threatened species.92 Although the Forest Service found that the exploratory
drilling activity could adversely affect the bears, it proposed mitigating
measures which it stated would reduce these effects so that no significant im-
pact on the bears would result.93 The effectiveness of these mitigating measures
was disputed, yet the court chose to uphold the decision of the Forest Service
not to prepare an impact statement. The court stated that the fourth criterion
of its four-part test was satisfied by the mitigating steps proposed by the Forest
Service, despite evidence offered to the contrary.95 This court did not subject
the agency's determination to the same level of scrutiny that it later exercised
in Sierra Club v. Peterson, where a minimal showing of a possible adverse en-
vironmental impact caused that court to require the agency to prepare the im-
pact statement before the leases were approved.96
Neither the Sierra Club decision nor the Cabinet Mountains decision, in
using the arbitrary and capricious standard, (modified as it is), seems to be in
line with the spirit of the "seminal" NEPA case, 97 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission.9" Although that
case did not discuss the issue of the standard of review to be used in examining
agency threshold determinations, it did give some indication that a strict stan-
dard of review would be in order. The court there stated, "this language does
not provide an escape hatch for foot-dragging agencies; it does not make
N EPA's procedural requirements somehow 'discretionary.' Congress did not
19685 F.2d 678 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
9uld.
1'd. at 679-80.
121d. at 679.
31d. at 680.
9Id. at 680.
'Id. at 682.
IbSierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1413.
"Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis of the Historical Development and Contemporary
Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 557, 563 (1984).
'1449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 19:4
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intend the Act to be such a paper tiger."" The court went on to say that Sec-
tion 102 sets a high standard for the agencies and must be "rigorously enforced
by the reviewing courts." '"
The District of Columbia Circuit's confusion exemplifies in a nutshell the
problem of differing review standards. Until the United States Supreme Court
issues a definitive opinion on what the standard should be, the lower federal
courts will continue to render different and confused decisions when reviewing
agency decisions under the NEPA. Federal agencies will not be able to make
threshold determinations of no significant impact and have them received in
the same fashion throughout the United States. The propriety of the agency
decision may rest at times on the location, jurisdictionally speaking, of the pro-
posed project.
THE "REASONABLENESS" STANDARD
A "reasonableness" standard is the least deferential standard which courts
have applied in reviewing agency determinations of no significant impact. The
courts that apply the reasonableness standard have expressed a belief that the
NEPA calls for a stricter standard than the "arbitrary and capricious" one used
under the APA.
Sdve Our Ten Acres v. Kreger states that the "spirit" of the NEPA re-
quires that the threshold decision not be "too well shielded from impartial
review," I' and that the "usual fact determination review rule ought not to be
applied to test the basic jurisdiction-type conclusion involved."'0 2 The Tenth
Circuit in Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, "3 stated that the
NEPA's requirements in Section 102 "clearly speak in mandatory terms, and
do not leave the determination to administrative discretion."" According to
that court, the "mandatory requirements and high standards" set by the
NEPA considerably narrow the scope of agency discretion.'"' The Ninth Cir-
cuit agrees with the assertion that the mandatory nature of the NEPA's pro-
cedural requirements remove the decision of whether to prepare an impact
statement from the agencies' sole discretion. Courts may review, de novo, the
agencies' findings to determine if they are reasonable."
The courts employing this standard of reasonableness review an agency's
decision and determine whether it was reasonable under the circumstances for
"Id. at 1114.
It1d.
"',Sve Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 466.
1.2Id.
10484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 1249.
'" ld. at 1249-50.
,'-Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't. of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172 19th Cir. 1982).
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the agency to conclude that a project had no significant environmental im-
pacts.' 7 In order for a court to implement this stage of review, it requires that
the party opposing the agency decision raise a "substantial environmental
issue" concerning the proposed project. In other words, the plaintiff must
allege "facts which if true, show that the recommended project would material-
ly degrade any aspect of environmental quality."' 8 If the plaintiff meets this
initial burden, then the court will examine and weigh the evidence of both the
plaintiff and the agency to determine whether the agency reasonably conclud-
ed that there were no significant environmental impacts.'0 9 Unlike the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard, under which the courts usually confine
themselves to an examination of the agency record," courts employing the
reasonableness standard may admit evidence extrinsic to the agency record if
the plaintiff makes a prima facie demonstration of incomplete development of
the written agency record."'
For example, in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,"2 plaintiffs were an
association of employees of the Corps of Engineers formed to oppose the selec-
tion of a downtown site in Mobile, Alabama for construction of a federal office
building."3 They challenged the decision of the General Services Administra-
tion (GSA) not to prepare an environmental impact statement for this
project." ' The GSA had determined that there would be no significant en-
vironmental impact. Their decision had been upheld in the district court which
had applied the arbitrary and capricious standard."' The Fifth Circuit declined
to apply that standard, choosing instead to use the reasonableness standard." 6
First, the Save Our Ten Acres court looked to see if plaintiffs' alleged facts
that raised a substantial environmental issue." '7 The court held that plaintiffs'
charges that the construction would create severe urban parking and traffic
congestion problems, aggravate an already existing air pollution problem, and
be improperly located on the Mobile River's floodplain, satisfied this initial
"Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 467, (court should examine the evidence to determine whether the agen-
cy reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no effects); Foundation for N. Am. Sheep,
681 F.2d at 1177, (an agency's determination that a particular project does not require the preparation of an
EIS is to be upheld unless unreasonable); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244,
1249 1 0th Cir. 1973), (the proper standard is whether the negative determination was reasonable).
"bSave Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 466.
"1ld. at 466-67.
""See e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners, 524 F.2d at 232.
"'Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 467, (this extrinsic evidence may consist of supplemental affidavits,
depositions and other proof).
"'472 F.2d 463 15th Cir. 1973).
"'Ild at 464.
"'ld. at 464-65.
"'Id. at 465.
1Id.
"1d. at 467.
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burden."' The court then remanded the case to the district court and required
that it weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency, to decide if the
agency's determination that no impact statement was necessary was a
reasonable conclusion.",9
This same analysis appears in Foundation for North American Wild
Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture. 2 Here the court held that
the Forest Service's determination of no significant impact was unreasonable
because the Service had failed to address certain crucial factors which plaintiff
had raised. These factors related to the issue of whether opening a mining road
in a canyon area would have an adverse impact on a herd of bighorn sheep.''
Specifically, the Forest Service had failed to consider the amount of traffic and
the effect it would have on the sheep's breeding habits and use of a mineral
lick.' The court also decried the Forest Service's "speculation" about the
sheep's tolerance of human intrusion. 3 The court stated that the purpose of
the NEPA's requirement that an environmental impact statement be prepared
"is to obviate the need for such speculation by insuring that available data is
gathered and analyzed prior to the implementation of the proposed action.' 24
This is the basic tenet of the reasonableness standard: that an agency not make
a decision concerning the environmental impact of a project until it has fully
considered the environmental issues involved. If those issues demonstrate con-
flicting evidence and a myriad of variables, then the agency should prepare an
impact statement.
Currently, approximately five of the twelve circuits have used the
reasonableness standard to review agency threshold determinations.' 2 The
Eleventh Circuit indicated that it will follow the decisions of the Fifth
Circuit, 26 thus it will presumably also follow the reasonableness standard
should it need to decide such a case.
The decisions employing "reasonableness" are consistent in their applica-
tion of the standard. They all utilize the basic approach of requiring a plaintiff
to raise a substantial environmental issue, followed by a weighing of the evi-
dence of both plaintiff and agency to determine if the threshold finding was
reasonable in view of this substantial environmental issue.' 27 Of course, the
"'Id. at 466.
"'Id. at 465.
"'681 F.2d 1172.
"'Id. at 1175-76.
04Id. at 1176.
"1id. at 1179.
124Id.
"'Those are the 3d, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th.
"'Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1981).
'"See e.g. Save Our Ten Acres. 472 F.2d 463; Foundation for N. Am. Sheep, 681 F.2d 1172.
C()MMENI'SSpring, 19861
13
Johns: Standards of Review for Agency Threshold Determinations Under NEPA
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVILW
"weighing" process depends on the plaintiff's ability to raise the environmental
issue, and if the plaintiff fails to do this, then the court will not consider the
reasonableness of the agency decision. 2 A plaintiff's inability to meet this bur-
den probably suggests "insignificance" as originally determined by the agency.
Agency threshold determinations have been upheld by courts using a
reasonableness standard. In Lower Alloways Creek Township v. Public Ser-
vice Electric and Gas Co.,'29 the Third Circuit found that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission had satisfied the requirements of the NEPA in its ap-
proval of a plan to enlarge the storage facilities for spent fuel at a nuclear
generating plant.'3° The court held that the Township had failed to satisfy its
burden of raising a substantial environmental issue, and that this "proved
fatal" to its cause.'3 ' That court stated, "judges are neither scientists nor techni-
cians; if judicial review of agency decisionmaking is to be productive and prof-
itable, courts must insist that litigants provide them with sufficient informa-
tion and analysis to assess critically the validity of the allegedly improper agen-
cy action."'3
In Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, ' the Eighth Circuit ruled for an agency's
determination of no significant impact in an action involving crossing the
Missouri River with power lines.'34 Here the plaintiff's allegation was not of
"sufficient significance to warrant shifting the burden of proof."'35 The plain-
tiffs had alleged that the power lines would prove harmful to bald eagles.36 The
court said that there was no evidence that eagles nested in the area, and that
throughout the United States few eagles were electrocuted each year, making
harm extremely unlikely.'
Both of these cases illustrate that plaintiffs' allegations of harm to the en-
vironment must be specific and backed up with facts, and have some possibility
of occurring. This makes it less likely that the reasonableness standard will be
abused by plaintiffs who seek to delay projects for reasons other than en-
vironmental ones.
One author has suggested that a policy of concern for the environment is
the motivation for the adoption of this stricter standard of reasonableness, and
is not legally justified, asserting that the APA should be used unless there is
'
2 Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982).
1'Id. at 734-35.
"'Id. at 743.
1Id.
'"621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
"4id. at 270.
1"ld. at 271.
'"Id. at 274.
1"1 Id.
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clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent.' However, en-
vironmental lawsuits are unique because of the highly scientific and technical
data involved and the valuation difficulties of assessing the worth of scenery
and degree of harm. Also, and more importantly, they are exceptional because
of the irreversible consequences of an environmental decision if harm is rea-
lized. 139 These are compelling reasons to require very careful consideration of
the consequences to the environment that could arise due to erroneous agency
decisions. The NEPA mandates such care, and its policy goals should be ad-
dressed as well as can be through strict compliance with the impact statement
process. To require the use of an arbitrary and capricious standard because the
NEPA does not expressly call for something else is "overly formalistic,"'140 and
ignores the purpose of the NEPA's procedural requirements.
The reasonableness standard is more flexible and works to better serve the
requirements of the NEPA. It gives a court more leeway when met with a
situation where an environmental impact statement should be prepared, yet
there is no clearly arbitrary action by an agency. A reasonableness standard is
not overly strict since it requires that there be a substantial environmental
issue raised before a court will consider the basis for an agency's determina-
tion.' Even when the burden shifts to the agency, the agency still has an op-
portunity to give its reasons for its threshold determination so that the court
can determine if there was a rational basis.'42
The courts using the reasonableness standard, or any other, do not ad-
dress the question of whether a project is or is not desirable.' An agency may
prepare an adequate environmental impact statement which demonstrates
serious adverse impacts, and still proceed to approve the project.'44 The courts
cannot overturn that decision by reason of the NEPA. 1'45 The NEPA mandates
only that the "environmental effects of the project be given appropriate con-
sideration."'46 As one court stated, "an agency may be free to decide that the
public should be subjected to grave risks."' 147
The United States Supreme Court has said that the NEPA is "essentially
' Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C.
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS L. REV. 63, 77 (1980).
'
39Kelly, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 10
B.C. ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS L. REV. 79, 83-4 (1982).
'1"Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 466.
'Id. at 466-67.
1421d.
"lid. at 467 ("it is not the province of the courts to review any actual decision on the merits").
14'City of New York, 539 F.Supp. at 1261.
41 Id. ("NEPA ... does not ... prescribe substantive results").
'"Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 467.
14City of New York, 559 F. Supp. at 1261.
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procedural," '48 and this demonstrates the limited role which the courts may
play in enforcing the policy goals of the NEPA. The Supreme Court has also
ruled that an appellate court cannot require an agency to give determinative
weight to environmental factors, favoring them above other factors.'49 This
forecloses the possibility of substantive judicial review under the NEPA.
The only teeth in the NEPA are the procedural requirements of Section
102(2)(c). Without that section the courts would have no basis to require agen-
cies to introduce environmental considerations into the balancing analyses in-
volved in decisionmaking. The NEPA would indeed be a "paper tiger."' 50 This
presents a strong argument that the NEPA must therefore be enforced
through its procedures, in the strictest way possible. A "reasonableness" stan-
dard currently represents the best way to do that.
CONCLUSION
The NEPA expresses Congress' desire to have agencies incorporate en-
vironmental considerations into their decision making process. It does this
with the action-forcing mechanism of Section 102(2)(c), which requires the
preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement for all "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
This statement must be made public so that all have access to the information
and may comment upon it.
Not all federal actions significantly affect the environment, and Federal
agencies therefore need not prepare impact statements in all situations. The
agency makes the initial determination of significance, and threshold determi-
nations of no significant impact have sparked a great deal of litigation. The
lower federal courts have applied, with variations, basically two standards of
review, the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA, and the reason-
ableness standard. The District of Columbia employs a four-part test to deter-
mine whether an agency determination was arbitrary and capricious.
The courts that use the arbitrary and capricious standard do so because of
their willingness to rely on agency expertise. Therefore, these courts allow
agencies much more discretion in making their threshold determinations.
However, the standard is not used consistently in the courts that employ it, in-
dicating that these courts do not necessarily find it ideal for the purposes of the
NEPA.
Confusion in the District of Columbia Circuit's decisions leaves unclear
how that circuit wishes its four-part test to work.
"'Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
For an interesting discussion of this case, See Raymond, A Vermont Yankee in King Burgers Court: Con-
straints on Judicial Review Under NEPA, 7 B.C. ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS L. REv. 629 (1979).
'
4 Stryckers Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
"
5UCalvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1114.
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The "reasonableness" standard is the least deferential and most flexible
standard. The courts that use it do so due to their belief that the NEPA man-
dates strict compliance with its procedural requirements, and leaves little room
for agency discretion. This standard is the most consistently applied, and en-
courages maximum enforcement of the N EPA's policies. Given the limitations
of the NEPA, it is perhaps the more effective and flexible standard.
The Supreme Court has declined to end the conflict among the circuits.
Until it gives the final word on the issue and establishes a uniform standard,
the decisions in lower courts will continue to be confused and divergent. Fur-
thermore, federal agency determinations will not be subjected to the same level
of scrutiny throughout the federal courts.
JANIE A. JOHNS
17
Johns: Standards of Review for Agency Threshold Determinations Under NEPA
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss4/12
